Rajesh Upadhayay v. State of Bihar & Anr.

The Supreme Court of India has held that suspension of sentence and grant of bail to a convict sentenced to life imprisonment for murder cannot be treated as a routine exercise during the pendency of an appeal. The Court emphasised that appellate courts must record cogent reasons and carefully assess the gravity of the offence, the role of the accused, and the evidence on record before suspending a sentence under Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Setting aside the order of the Patna High Court, the Supreme Court ruled that reliance on irrelevant considerations such as delay in forwarding the FIR or non-production of the original inquest report was legally unsustainable. The Court directed the convicted respondent to surrender, reaffirming that suspension of sentence in cases involving conviction under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the IPC is permissible only in exceptional circumstances.

Case Background

The case arose from the murder of Krishna Behari Upadhyay, father of the appellant, inside a village temple on 11 December 2021. According to the prosecution, a group of accused persons, armed with firearms and other weapons, forcibly entered the temple, surrounded the victim, and instigated his killing. One of the accused fired gunshots, causing fatal injuries that led to the victim’s death.

The respondent was tried along with other accused and was convicted by the Sessions Court under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the IPC and several allied offences, including offences under the Arms Act. He was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life along with fines.

What The Lower Authorities Held

During the pendency of his criminal appeal before the Patna High Court, the convicted respondent sought suspension of sentence under Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court allowed the application and ordered his release on bail.

The High Court relied primarily on three considerations: that the role attributed to the respondent was of instigation rather than direct firing, that the FIR was forwarded to the Magistrate after a delay of three days, and that the original inquest report was not produced. On this basis, the High Court concluded that suspension of sentence was justified during the pendency of the appeal.

The Court’s Reasoning

The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court had correctly exercised its jurisdiction under Section 389 of the CrPC. The Court reiterated that suspension of sentence after conviction is distinct from the grant of bail during trial and must be approached with greater caution.

Nature of the offence and role of the convict

The Court noted that the respondent stood convicted for murder with the aid of Section 149 IPC and had also been found guilty under the Arms Act. The evidence accepted by the Trial Court showed that the respondent was present at the scene with a country-made pistol and was actively instigating the killing.

The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in treating the respondent’s role as marginal. Instigation, particularly in the context of unlawful assembly and collective criminal action, constitutes serious participation and cannot be discounted while considering suspension of sentence.

Irrelevant considerations relied upon by the High Court

The Supreme Court found that the High Court’s reliance on the delay in forwarding the FIR to the Magistrate and the non-production of the original inquest report was misplaced. These aspects, the Court held, had no bearing on the credibility of the prosecution case, which had already been accepted by the Trial Court after full appreciation of evidence.

The Court emphasised that appellate courts should not reassess evidence or search for minor discrepancies at the stage of considering suspension of sentence.

Presumption of innocence after conviction

Reiterating settled law, the Supreme Court observed that the presumption of innocence operates only until conviction. Once a person is convicted after trial, the presumption no longer survives, and the burden shifts significantly while considering suspension of sentence.

Statutory Interpretation

The Supreme Court examined the scope of Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which empowers appellate courts to suspend the execution of sentence pending appeal. The Court clarified that this power is discretionary and must be exercised judiciously, not mechanically.

The provision requires appellate courts to record reasons in writing for suspending a sentence. In cases involving life imprisonment for murder, the Court held that suspension of sentence can be justified only where there is a glaring infirmity or a gross and apparent error in the judgment of the Trial Court.

Applying these principles, the Court concluded that no such exceptional circumstance existed in the present case to warrant suspension of sentence.

Constitutional / Policy Context

While dealing with the question of suspension of sentence, the Supreme Court situated its reasoning within the broader constitutional framework governing personal liberty and criminal justice. The Court acknowledged that Article 21 of the Constitution guarantees the right to life and personal liberty, including to convicted persons whose appeals are pending.

However, the Court reiterated that personal liberty after conviction is significantly circumscribed. Once a person is found guilty after a full-fledged trial, the balance between individual liberty and societal interest shifts decisively. The constitutional guarantee under Article 21 cannot be invoked to dilute the gravity of a conviction for murder or to undermine the authority of a reasoned judgment delivered by a competent criminal court.

The judgment reflects the Court’s consistent policy stance that crimes involving loss of life strike at the very foundation of social order, and judicial discretion in such cases must be exercised with extreme caution. Routine suspension of sentence in murder cases would erode public confidence in the administration of criminal justice.

Distinction Between Bail and Suspension of Sentence

A key clarification in the judgment concerns the distinction between grant of bail during trial and suspension of sentence after conviction. The Supreme Court emphasised that these two stages operate on fundamentally different legal principles.

During trial, an accused is cloaked with the presumption of innocence. After conviction, that presumption stands displaced by a finding of guilt. Consequently, suspension of sentence under Section 389 CrPC requires a far stricter scrutiny than grant of bail to an undertrial.

The Court cautioned appellate courts against treating suspension of sentence as an extension of pre-trial bail jurisprudence. Mechanical application of considerations such as delay, parity, or alleged infirmities in evidence is impermissible once a conviction has been recorded.

Role of Appellate Courts Under Section 389 CrPC

The Supreme Court reiterated that Section 389 CrPC confers a discretionary power, not an entitlement. The statute expressly requires appellate courts to record reasons in writing before suspending a sentence.

In serious offences punishable with life imprisonment or death, the reasons must demonstrate exceptional circumstances. The appellate court must satisfy itself that the conviction is prima facie unsustainable or that continuing incarceration would result in manifest injustice.

In the present case, the Court found that the High Court failed to undertake this mandatory exercise. Instead, it relied on peripheral factors without addressing the substance of the conviction or the evidentiary findings of the Trial Court.

Collective Liability and Instigation

The Supreme Court also addressed the High Court’s assumption that the respondent’s role was limited because he did not fire the fatal shot. The Court clarified that liability under Section 149 IPC is premised on membership of an unlawful assembly and the shared object of committing the offence.

Instigation, encouragement, or active facilitation of the crime forms an integral part of collective criminal liability. The Court held that minimising such participation at the stage of suspension of sentence amounts to disregarding the legal effect of Section 149 IPC.

The judgment reinforces that appellate courts must respect the findings of the Trial Court regarding collective intent and participation, unless there are compelling reasons to doubt their correctness.

Error in Re-appreciation of Evidence

The Supreme Court found that the High Court had effectively re-appreciated evidence while considering the application for suspension of sentence. By drawing adverse inferences from alleged procedural lapses, the High Court crossed the permissible limits of Section 389 jurisdiction.

The Court clarified that issues such as delay in forwarding the FIR or production of documents are matters for final adjudication in appeal. They cannot be treated as decisive factors warranting suspension of sentence unless they demonstrate a patent and glaring infirmity.

The judgment thus reaffirms that suspension of sentence proceedings are not a substitute for appellate evaluation on merits.

Why This Judgment Matters

This judgment reinforces a strict and principled approach to suspension of sentence in cases involving murder and other grave offences. It sends a clear signal that appellate courts must not dilute the seriousness of a conviction by relying on extraneous or marginal considerations.

For the criminal justice system, the decision strengthens consistency in post-conviction jurisprudence and preserves the sanctity of trial court findings unless exceptional circumstances justify deviation.

For practitioners, the judgment serves as authoritative guidance on the high threshold required for suspension of sentence under Section 389 CrPC.

Final Outcome

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the appellant and set aside the order of the Patna High Court granting suspension of sentence to the respondent.

The Court directed the respondent to surrender forthwith and continue to undergo the sentence imposed by the Trial Court during the pendency of the criminal appeal.

Case Details

• Case Title: Rajesh Upadhayay v. State of Bihar & Anr.
• Citation: 2025 INSC 1468
• Court & Bench: Supreme Court of India; MANMOHAN J. and N.V. ANJARIA J.
• Date of Judgment: 18 December 2025