Chief Justice’s Power To Appoint Additional Places of High Court Sitting Under States Reorganisation Act Is Continuing And Administrative: Supreme Court

Introduction

The Supreme Court has upheld the decision of the Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court to appoint Kolhapur as an additional place of sitting of the High Court under Section 51(3) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956. Rejecting constitutional and statutory challenges, the Court held that the power under Section 51(3) is a continuing, independent, and administrative power vested in the Chief Justice, exercisable with the approval of the Governor, and does not amount to the establishment of a permanent bench requiring Presidential intervention.

The judgment clarifies the distinction between a “permanent bench” and an “additional place of sitting,” delineates the limits of judicial review over internal judicial administration, and reinforces that decentralisation of High Court sittings—when undertaken for the convenience of litigants—furthers access to justice rather than undermines it. The ruling provides authoritative guidance on a provision that has often been misunderstood and frequently litigated.

Case Background

The writ petition was filed under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging an administrative notification issued by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, appointing Kolhapur as an additional place of sitting for Judges and Division Courts of the High Court. The notification was issued in exercise of powers under Section 51(3) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, with the approval of the Governor of Maharashtra, and was made operational in August 2025.

The petitioner contended that the notification was unconstitutional and ultra vires the Act. It was argued that the continuous sittings at Kolhapur effectively amounted to the establishment of a permanent bench, which could only be done under Section 51(2) of the Act by a Presidential order after consultation with the Governor and the Chief Justice. The petitioner also alleged lack of adequate consultation, arbitrariness, and violation of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.

Nature of the Impugned Decision

The impugned decision was taken on the administrative side of the Bombay High Court. No judicial adjudication preceded the issuance of the notification. The Chief Justice, acting as the administrative head of the High Court, exercised statutory power to organise the sittings of the Court in a manner considered convenient for the transaction of judicial business.

The challenge, therefore, did not arise from any order passed in exercise of judicial power, but from an internal administrative arrangement relating to the functioning of the High Court itself.

Issues Before the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court was called upon to examine:

• Whether Section 51(3) of the States Reorganisation Act confers a continuing power on the Chief Justice to appoint additional places of sitting;
• Whether continuous sittings at an additional place convert it into a permanent bench under Section 51(2);
• Whether the absence of Full Court consultation vitiates the exercise of power under Section 51(3);
• Whether the impugned notification violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution;
• The permissible scope of judicial review over internal judicial administration.

Supreme Court’s Analysis

Scheme of Section 51 of the States Reorganisation Act

The Supreme Court undertook a detailed examination of Section 51 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956. It noted that the provision was enacted as a permanent legislative framework to govern the organisation and functioning of High Courts in reorganised States.

The Court explained that Section 51(2) and Section 51(3) operate in distinct fields. Section 51(2) contemplates the establishment of permanent benches involving territorial bifurcation of High Court jurisdiction through a Presidential order. In contrast, Section 51(3) empowers the Chief Justice, with the Governor’s approval, to appoint additional places of sitting for the more convenient transaction of judicial business.

Continuing Nature of Power Under Section 51(3)

Rejecting the argument that Section 51(3) was intended to be exercised only temporarily or during transitional phases of reorganisation, the Court held that the provision contains no such limitation. Read with the General Clauses Act, the power is capable of being exercised from time to time as circumstances require.

The Court emphasised that convenience of litigants, regional accessibility, volume of litigation, and infrastructural capacity are dynamic factors. A statutory power intended to address such considerations cannot be frozen at a particular point in time.

Distinction Between Permanent Bench and Place of Sitting

A central aspect of the Court’s reasoning was the distinction between a “permanent bench” and an “additional place of sitting.” The Court clarified that Judges sitting at an additional place under Section 51(3) continue to exercise the jurisdiction of the same High Court. There is no exclusive territorial jurisdiction or institutional bifurcation.

The continuity of sittings at an additional place does not, by itself, transform the arrangement into a permanent bench under Section 51(2). What is determinative is the source of power and the nature of jurisdiction, not the duration of sittings.

Role and Authority of the Chief Justice

The Supreme Court reaffirmed the unique constitutional position of the Chief Justice as the administrative head of the High Court. Decisions relating to distribution of work, sittings of courts, and internal organisation fall squarely within the administrative domain of the Chief Justice.

The Court observed that the opinion of the Chief Justice represents the institutional opinion of the High Court. Unless shown to be mala fide, arbitrary, or ultra vires, such administrative decisions warrant judicial deference.

Consultation and Decision-Making Process

While acknowledging that consultation within the institution is a matter of good governance, the Court drew a clear distinction between what is desirable and what is legally mandatory. Section 51(3) requires the approval of the Governor, but does not mandate consultation with the Full Court.

The Court held that it would be impermissible to read into the statute requirements that the legislature has consciously omitted.

No Estoppel From Past Decisions

The petitioner relied on earlier committee reports and administrative decisions that had declined similar proposals. The Court rejected the contention that such decisions created an estoppel against future exercise of statutory power.

Administrative decisions are contextual and responsive to prevailing circumstances. Changed conditions—such as increased litigation, improved infrastructure, or regional needs—may justify a fresh exercise of power.

Limited Scope of Judicial Review

The Supreme Court reiterated that judicial review of administrative action is confined to examining legality, jurisdiction, mala fides, and constitutional compliance. Courts do not sit in appeal over administrative policy choices.

In matters concerning internal judicial administration, heightened restraint is required to preserve institutional autonomy and separation of powers.

Statutory Interpretation

Interpreting Section 51(3) purposively, the Court held that the provision is an enabling mechanism designed to impart flexibility to High Courts. It allows courts to respond to geographical, logistical, and administrative realities without resorting to structural reorganisation.

The Court clarified that exercise of power under Section 51(3) neither exhausts nor dilutes the power of the President under Section 51(2). Both provisions coexist and serve different objectives within the statutory framework.

Constitutional and Policy Context

Addressing the challenge under Article 14, the Court held that reasonable administrative differentiation is constitutionally permissible. Article 14 does not mandate uniform satisfaction of all regional demands.

On Article 21, the Court recognised access to justice as an integral component of the right to life. Physical accessibility of courts is a relevant factor in access to justice, particularly in geographically large States.

The Court rejected the argument that decentralisation diverts resources from subordinate courts, holding that allocation of judicial resources is a policy matter beyond judicial scrutiny.

Why This Judgment Matters

This judgment provides authoritative clarity on Section 51(3) of the States Reorganisation Act, a provision often invoked but frequently misunderstood. It strengthens the administrative autonomy of Chief Justices in organising High Court sittings.

For litigants and lawyers, the decision reinforces that decentralised High Court sittings are constitutionally legitimate and enhance access to justice. For institutions, it delineates clear boundaries for judicial review over internal court administration.

The ruling is likely to have implications for similar challenges across High Courts, ensuring consistency and stability in judicial administration.

Final Outcome

The Supreme Court dismissed the writ petition and upheld the notification appointing Kolhapur as an additional place of sitting of the Bombay High Court. Finding no statutory or constitutional infirmity, the Court declined to interfere.

No order as to costs was passed.

Case Details

• Case Title: Ranjeet Baburao Nimbalkar v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.
• Citation: 2025 INSC 1460
• Court & Bench: Supreme Court of India (Justice Aravind Kumar and Justice N.V. Anjaria)
• Date of Judgment: 18 December 2025